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AXIOMATIZING MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTUALISM IN
THIRD ORDER ARITHMETIC
NIK WEAVER
Abstract. We review the philosophical framework of mathematical conceptu-
alism as an alternative to set-theoretic foundations and show how mainstream
mathematics can be developed on this basis. The paper includes an explicit
axiomatization of the basic principles of conceptualism in a formal system CM
set in the language of third order arithmetic.
This paper is part of a project whose goal is to make a case that mathematics
should be disassociated from set theory. The reasons for wanting to do this, which
I discuss in greater detail elsewhere ([22]; see also [19] and [23]), involve both the
philosophical unsoundness of set theory and its practical irrelevance to mainstream
mathematics.
Set theory is based on the reification of a collection as a separate object, an
elementary philosophical error. Not only is this error obvious, it also has the
spectacular consequence of immediately giving rise to the classical set theoretic
paradoxes. Of course, these paradoxes are not derivable in the standard axiom-
atizations of set theory, but that is only because these systems were specifically
designed to avoid them. In these systems the paradoxes are blocked by means of
ad hoc restrictions on the set concept that have no obvious intuitive justification,
which has led to the development of a large literature of attempted rationalizations
(e.g., [2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15]). The heterogeneity of these efforts attests to the
difficulty of this task. For example, from a platonistic perspective it seems impossi-
ble to give a cogent, principled explanation of why it should be legal to form power
sets of infinite sets, given that unrestricted comprehension (forming the set of all
x such that P (x)) is not supposed to be valid in general. Antiplatonistic attempts
to justify set theory, on the other hand, appear doomed from the start because of
the massive gap in consistency strength between straightforwardly antiplatonisti-
cally justifiable systems like Peano arithmetic and, say, Zermelo-Frankel set theory.
The fact that modern mathematics apparently rests on this kind of basis must be
considered a major embarassment for the subject.
Probably the real appeal of set theory comes not from any murky philosophical
defense, but rather from the role it plays as the standard foundation for mathe-
matics. However, its concordance with normal mathematical practice is actually
quite poor. Cantorian set theory postulates a vast universe of sets containing re-
mote cardinals which bear no relation to the relatively concrete world of ordinary
mathematics, where most objects of central interest are essentially countable (i.e.,
separable for some natural topology). Similarly, set theory as a mathematical disci-
pline is quite isolated from the rest of mathematics, and it could hardly be otherwise
Date: May 23, 2007.
1
2 NIK WEAVER
given the gap between its subject matter and the subject matter of normal mathe-
matics.
One might still claim that even if set theory does not fit mainstream mathematics
very well, it nonetheless does so better than any foundational alternative. The main
purpose of the present paper is to show that this is false, by explaining how ordinary
mathematics can be developed in a concrete way that avoids the metaphysical
extravagance and nonseparable pathology of Cantorian set theory. The general
point is not new: many authors have observed that large amounts of mainstream
mathematics can be developed in surprisingly weak systems. I have already done
something like this myself in [20]. (Also see the introduction to [20] for other
references, and particularly see [16], which contains a very thorough development
that is relatively close to what we do here.) Actually, for a classically trained reader
[20] may be easier to read than the present paper, because the approach taken there
was modeled on the usual set-theoretic development of mathematics (in particular,
the formal language used there was the usual language of set theory); here the
goal is not to mimic set-theoretic mathematical foundations, but rather to find an
approach derived more directly from an alternative philosophical basis.
The philosophical approach we adopt, mathematical conceptualism, is a refine-
ment of the predicativist philosophy of Poincare´ and Russell. The basic idea is that
we accept as legitimate only those structures that can be constructed, but we allow
constructions of transfinite length. What makes this “conceptual” [19, 23] is that
we are concerned not only with those constructions that we can actually physically
carry out, but more broadly with all those that are conceivable (perhaps supposing
our universe had different properties than it does). The admission of transfinite
processes takes us well beyond intuitionism, which only allows finite constructions,
but at the same time our insistence on having some degree of constructivity is far
more restrictive than full-blooded platonism. The result is a foundational stance
that matches actual mathematical practice much better than either of these two
alternatives.
At the level of countable structures there is little practical difference between
conceptualism and platonism. However, uncountable structures in general can be
only partially realized in the conceptualist framework. For example, although we
can (transfinitely) construct individual real numbers (regarded, say, as Dedekind
cuts), we have no clear picture of a transfinite construction that would succeed
in producing the entire real line. Thus we might say that the real line exists
conceptualistically only in an unfinished state.
(A platonist might counter that the well-ordering theorem does give him a picture
of how the real line could be sequentially constructed one element at a time. This
is not a good argument because it is the set theoretic axioms — specifically, the
power set axiom — on the basis of which the well-ordering theorem is proven that
are in question here. If we take conceivability as a first principle then uncountable
constructions in general become highly dubious; see Section 1.2.)
We regard the idea of a completed surveyable real line in roughly the same way
that we regard naive infinitesimals, as an evocative idealization that does not really
have a definite meaning. Admittedly, this is at odds with normal mathematics,
which does treat the real line as a completed and in some sense surveyable structure.
However, it does not seem that this assumption is actually used in any serious way in
mainstream mathematics. The standard developments of all mainstream subjects
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can be executed perfectly well in a conceptualistic setting which treats the real line
and other structures at a similar level of complexity as only incompletely realizable.
The unfinished nature of the real line introduces logical subtleties which we han-
dle by adopting intuitionistic logic when quantifying over all real numbers. This is
one of the principal differences between conceptualism and earlier versions of pred-
icativism, where classical logic was used almost exclusively and there was persistent
confusion about the legitimacy of second order quantification (e.g., [5]). Alterna-
tively, one could avoid the use of intuitionistic logic by arresting the construction
of the mathematical universe at some natural point and reasoning classically about
the resulting fixed partial universe; this was the approach adopted in [20].
In the present paper we also go further and allow some reasoning about arbitrary
sets of real numbers, although this requires even greater care. This represents a
change from the point of view expressed in Section 2.5 of [21], where I would have
rejected any reference to arbitrary sets of real numbers. (However, I stand on the
main point of that discussion, that self-applicative schematic predicates are prima
facie predicatively invalid.) I now believe that reasoning at this level of abstraction
may be legitimate provided an even weaker logical apparatus, the minimal logic of
Johansson, is used. The justification for this conclusion is explained in [23]. It is
perhaps not crucial here because we are going to work with a restricted notion of
sets of real numbers to which ordinary intuitionistic logic does apply.
We will present a formal system CM for conceptualist mathematics and outline
how core mathematics can be developed within this system. The claim is that
virtually all mainstream mathematics can be straightforwardly realized in CM.
Our system CM is similar to systems in [16], and there is a strong resemblance
between our development and that in [16] (though the similarity to [20] seems
greater). The main differences lie in our use of third order variables, which simpli-
fies the presentation in some ways, and our use of non-classical logic, which is an
important theoretical distinction but has surprisingly little practical effect. Most
assertions of interest in mainstream subjects can be reduced to questions involving
quantification only over countable sets, at which point classical logic can be used.
1. Philosophical motivation
1.1. The concept of a set. Sets are typically defined as “collections of objects”,
and, crucially, these collections are themselves supposed to be objects capable of
belonging to other sets. This seems to be a simple grammatical confusion. If we
can talk sensibly about the set of all books in the Library of Congress, then “the set
of all books in the Library of Congress” must be a particular thing, the reasoning
apparently goes; it is not a physical object, so it must be a non-physical object.
But we can also talk sensibly about the average taxpayer; should we infer that this
is an actual (albeit non-physical) person? Is it really coherent to maintain that the
set of all taxpayers is a genuine “abstract object” while conceding that the average
taxpayer is just a figure of speech?
Despite its nonsensical official rationale, in sufficiently concrete settings the ap-
paratus of set theory can be straightforwardly justified. For example, if we want
to talk about sets of natural numbers as if they were actual objects, we can refer
instead to infinite sequences of 0’s and 1’s. Philosophical questions can still be
raised about the general concept of an infinite sequence of 0’s and 1’s, but these
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are questions about the notion of infinity which could be brought against any in-
terpretation of mathematics. The point is that we are no longer postulating the
existence of fictional entities based on a grammatical confusion.
In other words, set theory can be legitimized to the extent that we are able to
set up a system of token entities which can play the role of sets. And it is clear
that most of our intuition about sets comes from such token structures. When I
think of a set, it is not the set itself that I picture — how could I, when this is
supposed to be an abstract object that has no visual aspect — but rather some
structural representation. Perhaps this explains Go¨del’s famous comment that we
have “something like a perception” of sets ([7], p. 484). We do not have any per-
ception of sets, but we do have a conception, perhaps something like a perception,
of structures which can play the role of sets.
The philosophical literature on set theory tends to blur this distinction. In
particular, it is highly ambivalent as to whether sets can actually be formed or
manipulated in any sense, or whether they are really supposed to be absolutely inert
abstractions. The latter is the official platonist position, but language suggesting
the former is ubiquitous. This is particularly seen in the most popular explanation
of the paradoxes of naive set theory, which invokes an “iterative conception” of
sets according to which sets are to be thought of as being iteratively constructed
in stages. Of course, this makes no sense if they are simultaneously thought of as
being inert abstractions.
(Most authors who write about the iterative conception are clearly aware of
this difficulty. This sometimes results in strange comments to the effect that the
informal explanation of the iterative conception in quasi-constructive terms is not
supposed to be taken literally, which obviously begs the questions of how, then,
one is supposed to take it, and what meaning the iterative conception can have if
it cannot be explained in a way that makes literal sense.)
In practice, mathematical reasoning about sets consists largely of imagined quasi-
physical manipulations that could hardly apply to causally inert metaphysical enti-
ties. We order sets, we remove elements from them, we form products, we cut and
paste. Practically anything we would call a mathematical construction makes sense
only as applied to quasi-physical structures, not abstract sets. This suggests that a
rational approach to set theory would drop the nonsensical “abstract objects” in-
terpretation of sets and focus entirely on possible structures [8]. But we then have
to ask to what extent traditional set theory can be justified in this approach. In
particular, it would not seem to justify set-theoretic “constructions” like the power
set operation which do not correspond to any obvious quasi-physical construction.
1.2. Uncountable structures. Our choice of tokens for arbitrary sets of natural
numbers is special to that case, but it is natural to assume that a reasonable system
of tokens for arbitrary sets of X’s could be found for any choice of X. However, that
intuition may be misleading. There is no obvious system of tokens which could be
used to represent arbitrary sets of infinite sequences of 0’s and 1’s, for example.
We have to specify more clearly what would count as a token. We need not insist
that these actually be physically realizable in our universe. Above I used the term
“quasi-physical” with the intention of suggesting something like “physically realiz-
able in some conceivable universe”. This seems like the right criterion to use given
that we want to imagine manipulating these tokens in the ways mentioned above.
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So: could a meaningful system of tokens for arbitrary sets of infinite sequences of
0’s and 1’s appear in any conceivable universe?
The difficulty here is that in this example the tokens themselves would presum-
ably have to be uncountably large. So the question becomes whether it is possible
to clearly conceive of a universe that contains uncountable structures.
It is not so hard to imagine living in a universe that is infinite in extent and
contains a countable infinity of physical objects. Indeed, it is quite conceivable
that our own universe has this property. One can even imagine a universe that is
finite in extent but still contains a countable infinity of non-overlapping physical
objects whose sizes decrease rapidly enough that they collectively fill only a finite
volume. But what would it be like to live in a universe containing uncountably
many non-overlapping physical objects?
Such a universe is difficult to imagine, and there is a good reason for this: the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem. According to this theorem, any formal description
one could give of an uncountable universe would be equally true of some countable
substructure. Thus, there is nothing we can say, at least formally, that would serve
to distinguish an uncountable universe from a countable one. This suggests that we
have no a priori conception of any uncountable universe, which presents a serious
obstruction to any attempt at setting up a system of tokens to model a classically
uncountable structure.
Taking conceivability as a first principle really calls the whole notion of un-
countability into question. All classical methods of constructing uncountable sets
ultimately rely on the power set operation. But from the conceptualist perspec-
tive the latter cannot be justified unless one has a prior concept of uncountable
structures. This point may puzzle mathematicians who are accustomed to think-
ing of the power set operation as just one among many straightforward tools for
constructing sets. The crucial distinction that is missed here is between collections
that are surveyable (we have a clear picture of what it would mean to exhaustively
search such a collection) and those that are merely determinate (we can decide
whether any given object belongs to the collection, but have no clear idea even in
principle how one would go about searching through all objects in the collection).
The natural numbers are surveyable, their power “set” is merely determinate.
We have a clear idea of how we would go about searching through the natural
numbers, but not how we could search through the real numbers. So if “set” means
“surveyable collection” then we cannot a priori assume that the real line is a set.
But if “set” means “determinate collection” then basic set-theoretic constructions
become problematic: for instance, it is not clear that we can take the union of a
family of sets indexed by a determinate set since the result might not be determi-
nate. We cannot decide whether any given object belongs to the union because this
might require searching through the entire index set.
Somehow the vague sense that the natural numbers and the real line are both
“sets” has led us to transfer intuition about one to the other, resulting in the idea
that the power set operation is just a straightforward set construction. It is not.
Since uncountability is embedded so firmly in current thought, this point must be
emphasized: we have no obvious justification for the existence of uncountable struc-
tures that does not rely on the conflation of surveyable and determinate collections.
Moreover, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem gives us a powerful reason to expect
that no conceptualistic justification of uncountable structures is possible. If we
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cannot describe what it would be like to exist in a universe containing uncountable
structures (in a way that would distinguish it from some countable subuniverse),
then we presumably cannot imagine it either.
Thus, we reject the notion of actually existing uncountable structures, not just
in our universe but in any conceivable universe.
1.3. Countable constructions. As I mentioned in the last section, I think it is
quite possible that our universe is infinite in extent and contains infinitely many
disjoint physical objects. Regardless of whether this is actually the case, it would
be difficult to argue that this possibility is literally inconceivable. Therefore, we can
accept that countably infinite structures are legitimately part of the conceptualist
landscape.
A more subtle question involves the conceivability of transfinite computations
or constructions. By this I mean processes that not only potentially involve any
finite number of steps, but literally involve infinitely many steps, and may even
continue on after infinitely many steps have been completed. The philosophical
term for such a process is “supertask”. For example, we can imagine resolving the
Goldbach conjecture by mechanically searching through the natural numbers for a
counterexample; if no counterexample is found, the conjecture must be true. This
example could require the literal execution of infinitely many steps, since we might
not get an answer until after all numbers have been checked.
But can we really imagine carrying out and completing such a process? Can we
imagine what it would be like to live in a universe in which such supertasks were
possible? If not, then they cannot be admitted into the conceptualist picture.
It may not be obvious that literally infinite constructions are really conceivable.
However, several recent proposals for carrying out supertasks make it quite plausible
that one can indeed form a perfectly coherent picture of what doing this would be
like. My favorite is a suggestion due to Davies [4] that he calls “building infinite
machines”.
Briefly, Davies’ idea is something like this. Suppose we want to write down all
the natural numbers. To achieve this, we build a machine that accepts as input
a natural number n, and on this input it first writes down the number n (say,
in decimal notation) in front of itself; then, to its right, it builds a copy of itself
half its size that runs twice as fast; and finally it feeds this smaller copy the input
n+1 and sets it running. Having built such a machine, we feed it the number 1 as
input and set it running. It writes down the number 1, builds a smaller and faster
copy of itself, and feeds it the number 2 as input; that smaller copy writes down
the number 2, builds a still smaller and faster machine, and feeds it the number
3 as input; and so on. Because the machines are speeding up exponentially the
entire task is completed in a finite amount of time. Because they are shrinking
exponentially it takes place in a finite spatial region.
Davies observes that experiments like this would be possible in a continuous
Newtonian universe. I am not so sure that something like this is not actually
possible in our universe (with the machines being being “built” as perturbations
of the electromagnetic field, say), but for our purposes here merely being able
to imagine a universe in which it could take place is sufficient. I see no logical
obstruction to a universe in which an experiment of Davies’ type could actually be
performed.
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The task I have just described is a particularly simple kind of supertask; although
it does require the literal completion of infinitely many steps, its goal is merely to
write something down. More problematic would be a supertask like the one which
checks the truth of the Goldbach conjecture and returns an answer. It is not hard
to imagine programming a Davies machine to search through the natural numbers
looking for a counterexample, but since the size of the machines carrying out this
task goes to zero and we want a final answer to be returned on the scale of the first
machine, this seems to require a discontinuity. In a universe whose time evolution
is continuous there may well be a logical obstruction to carrying out such a task.
On the other hand, are universes with discontinuous time evolution literally
inconceivable? This would come as a surprise to proponents of the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics. In this interpretation the time evolution in
our universe is thought to involve a discontinuous “collapse” of the state vector
whenever an observer makes a measurement. This view can be criticized in many
ways, but one criticism I have never seen is that it is inconceivable because it
involves a discontinuous time evolution. Indeed, it is easy to imagine universes
whose time evolution is discontinuous.
If discontinuities are possible, then we can easily imagine building a sequence of
Davies machines next to a wire, say, and giving each machine the ability to send a
signal along the wire if it finds the counterexample it is looking for. A discontinuity
appears in the assumption that we have the ability to detect a signal coming from
any of the machines, no matter how small. On the basis of thought experiments
like these, we can justify the conceivability not only of countably infinite structures,
but also of some transfinite computations or constructions.
1.4. Quantifying over the reals. We have seen that the power set of the natural
numbers does not exist conceptualistically as a well-defined structure. But we have
also seen that the general notion of a set of natural numbers, realized as an infinite
sequence of 0’s and 1’s, makes perfect sense conceptualistically. The point is that
even though we have no notion of a construction that would generate all sequences
of 0’s and 1’s, we can nonetheless recognize such a sequence when we see one (or
at any rate we could build a Davies machine to perform such a check).
Similarly, regarding real numbers as Dedekind cuts, our notion of a general real
number is in the preceding sense completely definite, but the entire real line does
not exist conceptualistically as a well-defined structure.
Because we do understand the general concept of a real number, we can regard
assertions which quantify over all real numbers as intelligible, provided we are
slightly careful about interpreting the meaning of the quantifiers. For instance,
the classical interpretation of “there exists” only makes sense when quantifying
over the objects appearing in some well-defined structure, which we do not have
in this case. However, we can still interpret “there exists” constructively, i.e., we
can understand an assertion of the existence of a real number with some property
to be an assertion that we have some way of constructing it. Similarly, we take
an assertion that all real numbers have some property not as meaning that if one
checked all real numbers one would find they all have this property — this cannot
be done, even in principle — but rather as meaning that we can know in advance
that any real number that appears will have the property in question.
This is just the usual intuitionistic interpretation of quantifiers. Indeed, intu-
itionistic logic is exactly suited to the present situation. I will review this logic in
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Section 2.1. Its most salient property is that the law A∨¬A is not generally valid.
Classically this law can be justified by saying that the truth value of any statement
could in principle be determined by a mechanical search (much like the Goldbach
conjecture in our discussion above); thus any statement is definitely either true or
false. However, when we quantify over real numbers this justification is not avail-
able. Since the notion of “all real numbers” is indefinite in the sense that there
is no structural amalgamation of all real numbers which could be mechanically
surveyed, even in principle, we cannot generally affirm that any statement about
arbitrary real numbers has a definite truth value. Or, at least, since there could
be statements whose truth value cannot be determined even in principle, such an
affirmation would not have any substantive content.
The main point to keep in mind is that we cannot assume that all statements
have definite truth values; to a large extent, intuitionistic logic merely codifies the
forms of reasoning that one would naturally adopt in such a case.
1.5. Quantifying over sets of reals. Above I have distinguished between fixed,
surveyable structures which can be conceived in toto and determinate concepts
which can be partially, but never wholly, realized by actual concrete structures. For
us classically countable structures generally fall in the first category and classical
structures at the same level of complexity as the real line fall in the second. I
have also claimed that classical logic is appropriate only when quantifying over
surveyable structures and that intuitionistic logic should be used when quantifying
over indefinitely extendable but determinate concepts.
It must be emphasized that the individual elements that make up an indefinitely
extendable concept such as the real line are themselves concretely realizable struc-
tures. The logical subtlety arises when we discuss arbitrary structures of some type,
e.g., arbitrary sets of natural numbers.
We now want to consider the classical concept of an arbitrary set of real numbers.
Here even an individual — a single set of real numbers — in general can never be
concretely realized. So arbitrary sets of real numbers can have concrete reality
only as something like rules or prescriptions telling us how to decide, as new real
numbers become available, whether they should be accepted into or rejected from
the set.
I argue in [23] that the correct logic to use when reasoning at this level of ab-
straction is Johansson’s minimal logic. This is a weakening of intuitionistic logic
which omits the ex falso law that states that any assertion follows from a contra-
diction. The idea is that, unlike concrete structures, rules or prescriptions have a
genuine potential to be contradictory. Thus, we can set up standards for reasoning
about arbitrary rules, which is what minimal logic does, but we are not allowed
to decree that such rules will be free from contradiction. The subtle point is that
the meaning of the rules under discussion depends on the logical apparatus used to
reason about them, so incorporating an assertion of consistency into that apparatus
would be circular.
This point is pursued further in [23]. It is somewhat peripheral here since we
will work in a restricted setting where the ex falso law is valid. (We consider
only “determinate” subcollections of P(ω) for which the membership relation is
decidable, rather than the “definite” subcollections discussed in [23]. Thus the law
of excluded middle holds for all atomic formulas, which justifies ex falso; see Section
2.3 below.)
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1.6. Summary. We reject the proposition that sets literally exist as some kind of
ghostly non-physical objects. This assertion has no meaningful content, it is respon-
sible for the classical paradoxes of naive set theory, and it is not even compatible
with the grammar of set language in ordinary speech [17].
The way mathematicians use set language is also incompatible with the concept
of a set as an inert unitary object existing in some timeless metaphysical realm.
Mathematicians handle sets as if they were articulated structures capable of be-
ing physically manipulated. For the purposes of understanding the foundations of
mathematics, it therefore makes sense to focus on the concept of a possible structure
in a conceivable universe.
This radically changes the nature of mathematical foundations, most importantly
by delegitimizing the power set operation. There is no obvious “construction” of
a structure whose elements correspond to all substructures of a given structure.
Moreover, a general argument can be made that this would actually be incompatible
with the notion of a conceivable universe. Any conceivable universe should be
finitely describable, and hence subject to the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, which
would entail the incompleteness of any putative infinite “power set” structure.
Indeed, the applicability of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem to conceivable uni-
verses casts doubt on the general concept of an actually uncountable structure.
However, a good case can still be made for the literal conceivability of transfinite
constructions of length ω, ω2, ωω, etc.
In the foundational picture that emerges countable structures are seen as legiti-
mate but we do not accept the idea of an existing completed uncountable structure.
Rather, we treat concepts such as “real number” or “set of natural numbers” as
definite concepts which can be only incompletely realized as actual structures. This
calls for the use of intuitionistic logic when we quantify over all real numbers or all
sets of natural numbers.
We can also think of, for example, sets of real numbers as prescriptions telling
us how to decide whether each new real number, as it becomes available, is to be
accepted or rejected. It does not seem possible to meaningfully iterate this process
any further. Since “legitimate prescription” is not even a sharp concept, it is hard
to imagine how one could sensibly model the concept of an arbitrary set of such
things.
Our task is now to set out a formal system which expresses the philosophical
point of view set out above, and to show that it naturally accomodates the vast
bulk of normal mainstream mathematics.
2. The system CM
2.1. Systems of logic. Intuitionistic logic is most easily understood in terms of
systems of “natural deduction” [14]. For more details the reader may also consult
the excellent survey article [18].
Informally, the rules for natural deduction in minimal logic are:
• Given φ and ψ deduce φ ∧ ψ; given φ ∧ ψ deduce φ and ψ.
• Given either φ or ψ deduce φ ∨ ψ; given φ ∨ ψ, a proof of σ from φ, and a
proof of σ from ψ, deduce σ.
• Given a proof of ψ from φ deduce φ→ ψ; given φ and φ→ ψ deduce ψ.
• Given φ(x) deduce (∀x)φ(x); if the term t is free for x, given (∀x)φ(x)
deduce φ(t).
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• If the term t is free for x, given φ(t) deduce (∃x)φ(x); if y does not occur
freely in ψ, given (∃x)φ(x) and a proof of ψ from φ(y) deduce ψ.
Natural deduction involves the concept of “a proof of ψ from φ”; thus, for exam-
ple, we may temporarily assume φ, use this to prove ψ, and then infer the statement
φ→ ψ. Temporary assumptions can be nested, just as in normal informal reason-
ing, and one has to be slightly careful about allowing the variables involved in the
quantifier rules to appear in active temporary assumptions. See [14] or [18] for a
precise exposition.
Despite this minor complication, it should be evident that the rules of natural
deduction are indeed very natural and correspond exactly to ordinary informal
reasoning. It could be said that these rules are nothing more than a direct expression
of the meaning of the various logical sybols.
We let ⊥ stand for the statement “0 = 1” and define negation by letting ¬φ stand
for φ →⊥. Minimal logic contains no special rules for negation; in intuitionistic
logic we adopt the ex falso rule “given ⊥ deduce φ” for any formula φ, and in
classical logic we also adopt the law of excluded middle “φ∨¬φ” for any formula φ.
As I explained above in Sections 1.4 and 1.5, this is justified when we are reasoning
about objects belonging to a fixed surveyable structure, but not in broader settings.
It is easy to learn to reason intuitionistically using natural deduction. For exam-
ple, we prove (φ→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬φ) as follows: (1) assume φ→ ψ; (2) assume ¬ψ;
(3) assume φ; (4) deduce ψ from (1) and (3); (5) deduce ⊥ from (2) and (4); (6)
cancel assumption (3) and infer ¬φ from (5); (7) cancel assumption (2) and infer
¬ψ → ¬φ from (6); (8) cancel assumption (1) and infer (φ → ψ) → (¬ψ → ¬φ)
from (7). Exercise: verify ¬(φ∨ψ)↔ (¬φ∧¬ψ) and (¬φ∨¬ψ)→ ¬(φ∧ψ) (both of
these can be proven in minimal logic), and convince oneself that the last implication
cannot be reversed without using excluded middle. For practice with quantifiers the
reader can check that (∀x)¬φ(x) ↔ ¬(∃x)φ(x) and (∃x)¬φ(x) → ¬(∀x)φ(x) (again,
the last implication cannot be reversed without using excluded middle). A simple
example of a basic law whose proof requires the use of ex falso is [(φ∨ψ)∧¬φ] → ψ.
Minimal logic can also be formulated in the following more standard way. We
now eliminate the falsehood symbol ⊥ and take negation as primitive. There are
three logical rules of inference:
(1) given φ and φ→ ψ deduce ψ
(2) given φ→ ψ deduce φ→ (∀x)ψ
(3) if x does not occur freely in ψ, given φ→ ψ deduce (∃x)φ→ ψ.
There are eleven logical axiom schemes:
(1) φ→ (ψ → φ)
(2) (φ→ ψ)→ [(φ→ (ψ → σ))→ (φ→ σ)]
(3) φ→ [ψ → (φ ∧ ψ)]
(4) φ ∧ ψ → φ
(5) φ ∧ ψ → ψ
(6) φ→ (φ ∨ ψ)
(7) ψ → (φ ∨ ψ)
(8) (φ→ σ)→ [(ψ → σ)→ (φ ∨ ψ → σ)]
(9) (φ→ ψ)→ [(φ→ ¬ψ)→ ¬φ]
(10) φ(t)→ (∃x)φ(x)
(11) (∀x)φ(x) → φ(t)
AXIOMATIZING MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTUALISM 11
In axioms 10 and 11, t is a term which is free for x in φ.
Intuitionistic logic includes the axioms
(12) φ→ (¬φ→ ψ)
and classical logic additionally includes the axioms
(13) φ ∨ ¬φ.
2.2. The formal system CM. We introduce the formal language of third or-
der arithmetic. There are three kinds of variables: first order variables a, b, c, . . .
(thought of as ranging over ω), second order variables A,B,C, . . . (thought of as
ranging over subsets of ω), and third order variables A,B,C, . . . (thought of as
ranging over subsets of P(ω)). More concretely, we think of first order variables as
representing the objects appearing in some infinite sequence, second order variables
as representing infinite sequences of 0’s and 1’s, and third order variables as repre-
senting predicates which take any second order object as input and return either 0
or 1. A helpful heuristic is: first order objects are urelements, second order objects
are sets of first order objects, and third order objects are classes of second order
objects.
Numerical terms are built up from the number variables and the constant symbol
0 using the successor operation ′ and the binary operations + and ·. The atomic
formulas of the language consist of all formulas of the form t1 = t2, t1 ∈ X , and
X ∈ X where t1 and t2 are numerical terms, X is a second order variable, and X
is a third order variable. General formulas are built up from the atomic formulas
using the logical connectives ∧,∨,¬,→ and the quantifiers ∀n, ∃n, ∀X , ∃X , ∀X,
and ∃X for any first, second, and third order variables n, X , and X. Other symbols
such as ↔, ⊆, etc., are defined in terms of the above symbols in the usual way,
except for ⊆ at the third order level, which we will define in Definition 3.3.
The logical apparatus of CM is intuitionistic logic, as described in Section 2.1.
Additionally, we adopt the law of excluded middle φ ∨ ¬φ for all formulas φ that
contain no second or third order quantifiers. We also include the usual axioms for
equality between terms.
We now state the non-logical axioms of CM. Throughout the following m and n
are any first order variables, X , Y , and Z are any second order variables, and X is
any third order variable.
I. Number axioms:
(1) ¬(n′ = 0)
(2) m′ = n′ → m = n
(3) m+ 0 = m
(4) m+ n′ = (m+ n)′
(5) m · 0 = 0
(6) m · n′ = (m · n) +m
II. Induction and recursion axioms:
(7) [φ(0) ∧ (∀n)(φ(n)→ φ(n+ 1))]→ (∀n)φ(n)
(8) (∀n)(∀X)(∃Y )φ(n,X, Y )→ (∀X)(∃Z)[Z(0) = X ∧ (∀n)φ(n, Z(n), Z(n′))]
for all formulas φ.
III. Comprehension axioms:
(9) (∀n)(φ(n) ∨ ¬φ(n))→ (∃X)(∀n)(n ∈ X ↔ φ(n))
(10) (∀X)(φ(X) ∨ ¬φ(X))→ (∃X)(∀X)(X ∈ X↔ φ(X))
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for all formulas φ containing no free occurrences of X in (9), and no free occurrences
of X in (10).
The notation Z(n) is defined below in Definition 3.2. Essentially, axiom (8) states
that if for all n and X there exists Y such that φ(n,X, Y ), then for any X we can
find a sequence (Zn) such that Z0 = X and φ(n, Zn, Zn+1) holds for all n.
2.3. Discussion. We adopt the usual intuitionistic interpretation of the logical
symbols, e.g., (∃n)φ(n) means that we have (in principle) a way to find a value of
n satisfying φ; φ→ ψ means that we can convert any proof of φ into a proof of ψ;
and so on.
The rules of minimal logic presented in Section 2.1 directly express the meanings
of the logical symbols, and all atomic formulas satisfy the law of excluded middle.
(We have excluded middle for the statement n ∈ X for any n and X since any
sequence of 0’s and 1’s could in principle be surveyed to determine its truth value,
and we have excluded middle for the statement X ∈ X since third order objects are
assumed to assign a definite truth value to this statement for anyX .) This is enough
to justify the ex falso law; to see this, for each atomic formula A = A(x1, . . . , xn)
introduce a function symbol fA together with the axiom
(A(x1, . . . , xn)↔ fA(x1, . . . , xn) = 1) ∧ (¬A(x1, . . . , xn)↔ fA(x1, . . . , xn) = 0).
This extension of the original system should be unproblematic. But now assuming
⊥ we can deduce A→ ⊥, i.e., ¬A, for any atomic formula A = A(x1, . . . , xn), then
infer fA(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, then (since 0 = 1) infer fA(x1, . . . , xn) = 1, and finally
infer A. So in the extended system we can actually deduce any atomic formula A
from ⊥, which is enough to verify ex falso for the original system.
(In [23] we considered a broader notion of third order objects, the “definite”
subsets of P(ω). These do not have a decidable membership relation, so the above
justification of the ex falso law would not be valid. On the other hand, this choice
of third order objects would support a stronger comprehension scheme according
to which (∃X)(∀X)(X ∈ X ↔ φ(X)) for any formula φ which contains no third
order quantifiers and no free occurrence of X.)
The truth value of any formula with no second or third order quantifiers could
be determined by a countable computation, so we adopt the law of excluded middle
for such formulas.
The number axioms (1) – (6) assert basic facts which are evidently true for any ω-
sequence. The induction axioms (7) reflect our acceptance of countable procedures,
as they could be verified by deductions of length ω.
The recursion axioms (8) are usually called “dependent choice” [16], but in
the context of intuitionistic logic they should not be understood as choice ax-
ioms in the traditional sense. Intuitionistically we interpret the assertion (∀x)φ(x)
as expressing that there is a uniform proof of φ(x) for all x. Thus the premise
(∀n)(∀X)(∃Y )φ(n,X, Y ) entails possession of a uniform procedure for constructing
the desired sequence (Zn). In our setting the content of the axiom has to do not
with choice but with our ability to perform countable constructions.
The second order comprehension axioms (9) hold because we take subsets of ω to
be modelled by (in principle) actually existing infinite sequences of 0’s and 1’s: if we
knew that φ(n)∨¬φ(n) held for all n then in principle we could determine the truth
value of φ(n) for every n and use this information to construct a corresponding X .
The third order comprehension axioms (10) are immediately justified by the fact
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that we take third order variables to stand for predicates which assign a definite
truth value to the assertion X ∈ X for any X . That is, we can take X to be the
formula φ itself.
Our conception of second order objects as appearing in well-ordered stages, such
that only countably many of them are available at each stage, would also support
a genuine choice axiom. The most straightforward way to formalize it would be to
augment CM with a second order relation symbol ≺ and add axioms asserting that
≺ is a total ordering, together with the axioms
(∀X)[(∀Y )(Y ≺ X → φ(Y ))→ φ(X)]→ (∀X)φ(X)
asserting progressivity of ≺. This should only be asserted for formulas that do not
contain ≺, for reasons having to do with the circularity involved in making sense of
a relation that is well-ordered with respect to properties that are defined in terms
of that relation; see Section 2.5 of [21]. We could also add the axiom
(∀X)(∃Z)(∀Y )[Y ≺ X → (∃n)(Y = Z(n))]
expressing the fact that only countably many second order objects are available
at any moment. We call the resulting system CM+. None of the mathematics we
develop in Section 3 requires the extra axioms of CM+.
We record two general facts about CM that will be of use in the next section.
First, the comprehension axioms immediately imply arithmetical comprehension:
Theorem 2.1. (a) Let φ be a formula that contains no free occurences of X and
no second or third order quantifiers. Then CM proves
(∃X)(∀n)(n ∈ X ↔ φ(n)).
(b) Let φ be a formula that contains no free occurences of X and no second or
third order quantifiers. Then CM proves
(∃X)(∀X)(X ∈ X↔ φ(X)).
Second, we have a principle of numerical omniscience:
Theorem 2.2. For any formulas φ and ψ, CM proves
(∀n)(φ(n) ∨ ψ(n))→ [(∀n)φ(n) ∨ (∃n)ψ(n)].
Intuitively, our ability to perform countable constructions and the fact that we
have a uniform proof of φ(n)∨ψ(n) allows us to verify either (∀n)φ(n) or (∃n)ψ(n).
The theorem is formally proven as follows. Suppose (∀n)(φ(n) ∨ ψ(n)). Then for
any n there exists X such that
(φ(n) ∧ 0 ∈ X) ∨ (ψ(n) ∧ 0 6∈ X).
Dependent choice (axiom (8)) followed by arithmetical comprehension then yields
a set Y such that
(φ(n) ∧ n ∈ Y ) ∨ (ψ(n) ∧ n 6∈ Y )
holds for all n. Finally, since classical logic holds for formulas without second or
third order quantifiers, we have (∀n)(n ∈ Y ) ∨ (∃n)(n 6∈ Y ), and we can then infer
(∀n)φ(n) ∨ (∃n)ψ(n).
As a special case of numerical omniscience we have that (∀n)(φ(n) ∨ ¬φ(n))
implies both (∀n)φ(n)∨¬(∀n)φ(n) and (∃n)φ(n)∨¬(∃n)φ(n). In effect, this means
that any formula whose truth can be evaluated in countably many steps satisfies
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the law of excluded middle. This is important because it implies that we can use
classical logic, in particular proofs by contradiction, in such cases.
As an alternative formulation of CM we could adopt numerical omniscience as
an axiom and only assume the law of excluded middle for atomic formulas. It
comes to the same thing because numerical omniscience plus excluded middle for
atomic formulas implies excluded middle for all arithmetical formulas (by induction
on formula complexity).
3. Development of core mathematics
3.1. Preliminaries. The remainder of the paper will sketch how core mathematics
can be developed within the framework presented in Section 2. We concentrate
on analysis because this is the mainstream area that is, broadly speaking, most
resistant to formalization in weak systems. Our development is similar to the one
in [20]. Probably the main hurdles to overcome are getting accustomed to the basic
set-up established in the present section and familiarizing oneself with the technique
of using comprehension axioms to prove existence results. In the following we will
reason informally in CM.
Definition 3.1. Let N˜ be a second-order constant denoting the natural numbers
(including zero):
(∀n)(n ∈ N˜).
N˜ exists by second order comprehension. CM contains the axioms of Peano
arithmetic, so elementary number theory in N˜ can be developed as usual.
Definition 3.2. An ordered k-tuple of natural numbers (k ≥ 2) is a nonzero natural
number having no prime divisors besides p1, . . . , pk, where pi is the ith prime. We
write 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 = p
a1
1 · · · p
ak
k . For any X1, . . . , Xk (k ≥ 2) we define
X1 × · · · ×Xk = {〈a1, . . . , ak〉 : a1 ∈ X1, . . . , ak ∈ Xk}.
A sequence of second order objects is a second order object contained in N˜2 = N˜×N˜ .
For such an object X and each a ∈ N˜ we write X(a) = {b : 〈a, b〉 ∈ X}.
At the third order level, for anyX1, . . . ,Xk (k ≥ 2) we define X0×· · ·×Xk to be
the third order object consisting of all sequencesX of second order objects such that
X(0) ∈ X0, . . . , X(k) ∈ Xk, andX(l) = ∅ for all l > k; we writeX = 〈X(0), . . . , X(k)〉.
In the preceding definition X1 × · · · × Xk, X(a), and X0 × · · · × Xk all exist
by arithmetical comprehension. Also observe that if X = (X(n)) is a sequence of
second order objects then
⋃
X(n) and
⋂
X(n) exist by arithmetical comprehension.
We now introduce set language. Notice that in classical set theory quotient
constructions involve passing to a higher type, an avenue that is not available
here. One way to define quotients in the present setting would be to model the
quotient structure by selecting one element from each equivalence class. This could
generally be done using the third order choice axiom in CM+ (see Section 2.3), but
this method introduces extraneous information. In other words, quotients become
noncanonical.
We opt instead to model a “set” as a third order object equipped with an equiv-
alence relation. This is reflected in the basic definitions that follow but shows up
almost nowhere else: once we agree that we are, in effect, always working up to
equivalence, there is no further need to explicitly refer to that equivalence.
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Definition 3.3. A set is a third order object X together with a third order object
≡ contained in X2 = X × X which is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. We
call ≡ the identity on X. Notationally, we will typically suppress ≡ and refer to
X as the set. A subset of a set X is a third order object Y that is contained in
X and satisfies X ∈ Y, X ≡ Y ⇒ Y ∈ Y, together with the identity (≡ ∩Y2).
We write Y ⊆ X. A quotient of a set X with identity ≡ is the same third order
object X together with an identity ≡′ that contains ≡. The product of two sets
X and Y is the third order object X × Y together with the identity defined by
〈X,Y 〉 ≡ 〈X ′, Y ′〉 if and only if X ≡ X ′ and Y ≡ Y ′.
A relation on a set X is a subset of X2. A function from a set X to a set Y
is a subset f of X ×Y such that for every X ∈ X there exists exactly one (up to
identity) Y ∈ Y with 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ f .
The next proposition should help orient the reader to the kind of thinking in-
volved in reasoning in CM.
Proposition 3.4. Let X and Y be sets, let f : X → Y be a function, and let Y0
be a subset of Y. Then f−1(Y0) exists and is a subset of X.
Proof. We show that the condition “f(X) ∈ Y0” satisfies excluded middle. By
third order comprehension this implies that f−1(Y0) = {X ∈ X : f(X) ∈ Y0}
exists; the fact that it is compatible with the identity on X is an easy consequence
of the fact that f is a subset of X ×Y together with the definition of the identity
on X×Y.
To verify the claim, let X ∈ X. Then by the definition of a function there exists
Y ∈ Y, unique up to identity, such that 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ f . Since we assume excluded
middle for arithmetical formulas, we have (Y ∈ Y0) ∨ (Y 6∈ Y0), and since Y0 is
a subset of Y this truth value does not depend on the choice of Y up to identity.
Therefore f(X) ∈ Y0 satisfies excluded middle. 
In contrast, the push-forward f(X0) need not exist in general because we have no
way to effectively test whether a given Y ∈ Y belongs to the image. The image of
X0 is continually expanding as new second order objects appear, and given Y ∈ Y
we may not be able to predict whether some future X ∈ X will map to Y . (Inverse
images also expand, but given X ∈ X the fact that f is a function means that we
can construct f(X) and we can then immediately check wither f(X) belongs to Y0.
Further expansion of Y0 cannot affect this result.)
However, if X0 is countable (see Definition 3.8 below) then we can use numerical
omniscience to check whether Y belongs to f(X0), so images of countable sets do
always exist (Proposition 3.9).
3.2. Z˜ and Q˜. We encode the integers using a sign bit (0 for + and 1 for −):
Definition 3.5. Let Z˜ be a second order constant denoting the set of all ordered
pairs of natural numbers 〈a, b〉 such that either a = b = 0 or a > 0 and b = 0 or 1.
We define addition in Z˜ by letting 〈a, b〉+ 〈a′, b′〉 be
〈a+ a′, b〉 if b = b′
〈a− a′, 0〉 if b = 0, b′ = 1, and a ≥ a′
〈a′ − a, 1〉 if b = 0, b′ = 1, and a < a′
〈a− a′, 1〉 if b = 1, b′ = 0, and a > a′
〈a′ − a, 0〉 if b = 1, b′ = 0, and a ≤ a′.
The product and the order relation are defined by cases in the same way.
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The existence of Z˜ is provable in CM by arithmetical comprehension. Basic
properties of Z˜ as an ordered ring are straightforwardly provable as facts of first
order arithmetic.
We define the rationals as fractions in lowest terms.
Definition 3.6. Let Q˜ be a second order constant denoting the set of all ordered
pairs 〈a, b〉 with a, b ∈ Z˜ relatively prime and b positive.
Here “relatively prime” and “positive” mean with respect to the product and
order on Z˜. Q˜ exists by arithmetical comprehension.
We define order, addition, multiplication, and division (with nonzero denomina-
tor) in Q˜ in the usual way. All these definitions are arithmetical and basic properties
of Q˜ as an ordered field are straightforwardly provable as facts of first order arith-
metic. (For more details on the material of this section, with inessentially different
definitions, see Section II.4 of [16].)
3.3. The real line. We now define the real line in terms of Dedekind cuts of Q˜.
Definition 3.7. Let R be a third order constant satisfying X ∈ R if and only if
X ⊆ Q˜, ∅ 6= X 6= Q˜, X has no greatest element, and
(p ∈ X, q ∈ Q˜, q < p)⇒ q ∈ X
(where < is the order relation defined on Q˜). We equip R with the trivial identity
x ≡ y ⇔ x = y.
R contains canonical copies of N˜ , Z˜, and Q˜, which we denote N , Z, and Q. For
instance, X ∈ Q holds if and only if there exists p ∈ Q˜ such that q ∈ X ⇔ q < p.
Note that by arithmetical comprehension, for any X˜ ⊆ Q˜ there exists X ⊆ Q
containing the corresponding elements, and vice versa. Similar statements hold for
N and Z. Thus, we can effectively identify N with N˜ , Z with Z˜, and Q with Q˜,
and we will generally do so without comment.
Now that we have a third order version of N , we can make the following defini-
tions:
Definition 3.8. A set X is countable if there exists a surjective function f from N
to X. A sequence of subsets of X is a subset Y of N ×X; we write
Y(n) = {X : 〈n,X〉 ∈ Y}
(and set X ≡ Y in Y(n) if 〈n,X〉 ≡ 〈n, Y 〉 in Y). The product
∏
Y(n) of a sequence
Y of subsets of a set is the set of all sequences Y of second order objects such that
Y(n) ∈ Y(n) for all n, with Y ≡ Y
′ if Y(n) ≡ Y
′
(n) for all n.
For any n ∈ N˜ andX ⊆ N˜ the ordered pair 〈n,X〉 exists by arithmetical compre-
hension. It follows that ifY is a sequence of subsets ofX thenX ∈ Y(n)∨X 6∈ Y(n),
for any n and X . From this one easily sees (using third order comprehension) that⋃
Y(n) and
⋂
Y(n) exist.
Proposition 3.9. Let f : X → Y be a function and let X0 ⊆ X be countable.
Then f(X0) exists and is a subset of Y.
Proof. We can verify excluded middle for the condition (∃X)(X ∈ X ∧ Y = f(X))
by numerical omniscience. 
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The order relation and the algebraic operations on R are easily (arithmetically)
defined. Also, if (Xn) is a sequence of reals that is bounded above then
⋃
Xn ∈ R
is its least upper bound. So R is, in this sense, a sequentially complete ordered
field. The converse is also true:
Theorem 3.10. R is a sequentially complete ordered field. Every sequentially
complete ordered field is isomorphic to R.
The second statement of the theorem is proven in the usual way: given any se-
quentially complete ordered field F, first isolate the countable subfield F generated
by 1; then establish an isomorphism between F and Q; and finally show that F is
dense in F and use this to define the desired isomorphism between F and R. The
novelty here is that the existence of F requires proof. The result we need is stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.11. Any countable subset of a field F generates a countable subfield of
F.
Proof. Let S ⊆ F be countable. The lemma does not follow from arithmetical
comprehension; we must prove directly that the condition “X is in the subfield
generated by S” is expressible in a way that satisfies the law of excluded middle,
so that third order comprehension can be used. Informally, we expand the above
to “there is a word in elements of S which when evaluated in F produces X , up
to identity.” Next we use induction on word length to check that for any word w
the statement “evaluating w in F produces X , up to identity” satisfies excluded
middle. Enumerating the words as (wn), second order comprehension then verifies
the existence of a sequence (Xn) such that Xn is the result of evaluating wn in F
(or Xn = 0 if wn does not evaluate). Finally, numerical omniscience implies the
law of excluded middle for the assertion (∃n)(X ≡ Xn). Together with third order
comprehension, this shows that the subfield of F generated by S exists. 
The same argument will apply in more general algebraic settings to show the
existence of countably generated subobjects.
The preceding proof is a good illustration of the technique of combining nu-
merical omniscience with comprehension for existence results. This will be used
repeatedly in the sequel. The general principle is: if we can test whether φ(X)
holds in countably many steps then {X : φ(X)} exists.
Theorem 3.12. R is Cauchy complete.
Proof. This follows from the formula
lim inf Xn =
⋃
n∈N
⋂
k≥n
(Xk − 1/n),
where Xk − 1/n ∈ R is taken literally as a Dedekind cut. 
Proposition 3.13. Let X ⊆ R. Then any sequence of functions fn : X→ R which
converges pointwise has a pointwise limit f : X→ R.
Proof. By arithmetical comprehension. 
Polynomial functions from R to itself are arithmetically definable. It easily fol-
lows that all of the standard continuous functions from real analysis (sinx, cosx,
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ex, lnx, etc.) may be defined. Standard discontinuous functions such as the Heavi-
side step function, the comb function, and the characteristic function of the Cantor
set are also straightforwardly definable.
3.4. Topology in R. Let Q+ = {p ∈ Q : p > 0} and R+ = {x ∈ R : x > 0}. (We
will now start using lowercase letters to denote elements of R.)
Definition 3.14. A subset U ⊆ R is open if there is a set P ⊆ Q×Q+ such that
x ∈ U if and only if |p− x| < r for some 〈p, r〉 ∈ P . We call P a witness for U.
An open ball in R is a set of the form
ballr(x) = {y ∈ R : |x− y| < r}
for some 〈x, r〉 ∈ R×R+.
Proposition 3.15. (a) Open balls are open.
(b) The union of any sequence of open subsets of R is open.
(c) The intersection of any finitely many open subsets of R is open.
Proof. Parts (a) and (c) are routine. In part (b), given a sequence (Un) of open
sets we need to use dependent choice to select a sequence of witnesses (Pn); the
union of this sequence is then a witness for
⋃
Un. 
Definition 3.16. The closure of a countable set C ⊂ R is the set
{x ∈ R : for every n there exists y ∈ C such that |x− y| < 1/n}.
A subset C of R is closed if it is the closure of a countable set C ⊂ R; we call C a
witness for C.
In the definition of closure, observe that for any x the existence, for every n ∈ N ,
of a point y ∈ C such that |x − y| < 1/n satisfies the law of excluded middle by
numerical omniscience, because N and C are countable. Thus the closure of C
exists by third order comprehension. This technique was already introduced in the
proof of Lemma 3.11 and from now on we will use it without comment.
Proposition 3.17. Closed subsets of R are sequentially closed (i.e., contain all
limits of Cauchy sequences).
Proof. Let C be the closure of a countable set C and enumerate the elements of C
as (xk). Now let (yn) be a Cauchy sequence in C. For each n let kn be the smallest
index such that |yn−xkn | < 1/n; then the sequence (xkn) is Cauchy and converges
to the same limit as (yn), hence that limit belongs to C. 
Theorem 3.18. A subset of R is closed if and only if its complement is open.
Proof. The forward direction is easy: given a witness C for a closed set, the set
of pairs 〈p, r〉 ∈ Q × Q+ such that |p − x| ≥ r for all x ∈ C is a witness for the
complementary open set. For the reverse direction, given a witness P for an open
setU we construct a witness C for the complementary closed set C as follows. First
let C0 be the set of rationals in R−U, i.e., the set of p′ ∈ Q such that |p′ − p| ≥ r
for all 〈p, r〉 ∈ P . Then for each rational p ∈ U let Sp be the set of p′ ∈ Q such that
there is a finite sequence of elements 〈pi, ri〉 ∈ P , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with p ∈ ballr1(p1),
p′ ∈ ballrn(pn), and ballri(pi)∩ballri+1(pi+1) 6= ∅ for 1 ≤ i < n. If Sp is bounded
above then let xp be its least upper bound; thus xp is the smallest element of C
that is greater than p. Finally, let C1 be the set of all such elements xp and let
C = C0 ∪C1. One easily checks that C is the closure of C. 
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Corollary 3.19. (a) The intersection of any sequence of closed subsets of R is
closed.
(b) The union of any finitely many closed subsets of R is closed.
Proposition 3.20. Let X ⊆ R and let X ⊆ X be countable. Then every open ball
about any point in X intersects X if and only if X is contained in the closure of
X.
Definition 3.21. We say that X ⊆ R is separable if it has a countable subset X
such that either of the two equivalent conditions in Proposition 3.20 is satisfied.
We say that X is dense in X.
Lemma 3.22. Every open subset of R is separable, as is every closed subset of R.
Proposition 3.23. Let X ⊆ R be a separable subset and let Y = R−X.
(a) X is closed if and only if it is closed under limits of Cauchy sequences.
(b) Y is open if and only if for every x ∈ Y there exists r > 0 such that
ballr(x) ⊆ Y.
Proof. (a) The forward direction was Proposition 3.17. For the reverse direction
suppose X is sequentially closed, let C be a countable dense subset of X, and let C
be the closure of C. Then X is contained in C by density and X contains C since
it is closed under Cauchy convergence. So X = C and hence X is closed.
(b) The forward direction is trivial; for the reverse direction let C be a countable
dense subset of X = R−Y and verify that Y is disjoint from the closure of C. It
follows that X is the closure of C, hence X is closed, hence Y is open. 
Definition 3.24. K ⊆ R is compact if every sequence of open sets that covers K
has a finite subcover.
Theorem 3.25. Let K be a separable subset of R. Then the following are equiva-
lent:
(i) K is closed and bounded;
(ii) K is compact;
(iii) K is bounded and contains the limits of all of its Cauchy sequences;
(iv) every sequence in K has a subsequence which converges to a limit in K.
Proof. The proofs of (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (iii) ⇒ (iv) are standard and do not use separa-
bility. For (iv)⇒ (i), suppose every sequence has a convergent subsequence and let
C be a countable dense subset of K. Then by numerical omniscience the assertion
“C is bounded” satisfies excluded middle, so a proof by contradiction shows that C,
and hence K, must be bounded. The fact that K is closed follows from Proposition
3.23 (a). 
Definition 3.26. Let X ⊆ R. We say that a function f : X→ R is continuous if
the inverse image of any open set in R is the intersection of an open subset of R
with X.
Theorem 3.27. Suppose X ⊆ R is separable and let f : X → R be a function.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) f is continuous;
(ii) the inverse image of every closed set in R is the intersection of a closed set
in R with X;
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(iii) for any countable set C ⊆ X with closure C we have x ∈ C ∩X ⇒ f(x) ∈
f(C);
(iv) f preserves convergence of sequences;
(v) for every x ∈ X and every ǫ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that d(x, y) < δ
implies d(f(x), f(y)) < ǫ.
Proof. The proofs of (i)⇒ (ii)⇒ (iii)⇒ (iv) are standard and do not use separabil-
ity. For (iv) ⇒ (v), let X be a countable dense subset of X. We first show that the
ǫ-δ condition holds for x and y in X and with ǫ and δ restricted to rational values.
If not then we can find x ∈ X and a sequence (yn) ⊆ X such that yn → x but
f(yn) 6→ f(x), contradicting (iv). Since X is countable and ǫ and δ are restricted to
the rationals we have excluded middle, so we conclude that the ǫ-δ condition does
hold for x in X . Since X is dense in X and f preserves convergence of sequences,
(v) follows easily.
For (v) ⇒ (i), again let X be a countable dense subset of X. Also let U ⊆ R
be an open set with witness P . Let P ′ be the set of pairs 〈p′, r′〉 ∈ Q × Q+ such
that f(X ∩ ballr′(p′)) ⊆ ballr−ǫ(p) for some 〈p, r〉 ∈ P and some ǫ > 0. It is then
straightforward to verify that P ′ is a witness for an open set U′ which satisfies
U′ ∩X = f−1(U). 
Theorem 3.28. The sum and product of two continuous functions from X ⊆ R
to R are continuous. The composition of two continuous functions, if defined, is
continuous.
Theorem 3.29. Let X ⊆ R and let f : X → R be continuous. If X is separable
and compact then f is bounded and achieves its maximum and minimum. If X
contains the interval [a, b] then f attains every value between f(a) and f(b).
Proof. For the first statement, let X = (xn) be a countable dense subset of X,
pass to a subsequence (xnk) such that f(xnk ) converges to sup f(xn) or inf f(xn)
(possibly ±∞), then pass to a subsequence which converges in X , and finally apply
Theorem 3.27 (iv) (showing ±∞ are not possible maximum and minimum values).
For the second statement, suppose f(a) 6= f(b) and let z be any value strictly
between f(a) and f(b). Consider the disjoint open sets U = f−1((−∞, z)) and
V = f−1((z,∞)). Without loss of generality suppose a ∈ U and b ∈ V. Let Y be
the set of rationals p > a such that every rational in [a, p] lies in U; then x = supY
cannot lie in U (since U is open) or in V (since V is open and disjoint from U).
Also a < x < b, so that x ∈ X. Since f(x) 6∈ R− {z} we must have f(x) = z. 
3.5. Metric spaces.
Definition 3.30. A metric space is a set X together with a function d : X×X→
[0,∞) which satisfies the usual metric axioms. It is complete if every Cauchy
sequence converges. A subset is dense if it intersects every open ball ballr(x) =
{y ∈ X : d(x, y) < r} and a space is separable if it contains a countable dense
subset.
Proposition 3.31. Every metric space densely embeds in a complete metric space.
This embedding is unique up to an isometric isomorphism fixing the original space.
Proof. The proof is essentially the standard one. The set of Cauchy sequences in a
metric space exists by third order comprehension, as does the standard equivalence
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relation on Cauchy sequences. We can then use this equivalence relation as the
identity in the set of Cauchy sequences. The remainder of the proof is standard. 
This is our first serious use of the convention that identity in sets is determined
by equivalence relations.
A subtle point: although there is a function f that embeds X into its completion,
the image f(X) need not exist as a set. We noted earlier (at the end of Section
3.1) that images of sets do not exist in general, and this is true even in the present
rather special situation.
Definition 3.32. Let X be a metric space. A subset U ⊆ X is open if there is a
countable set P ⊆ X ×R+ such that U =
⋃
〈x,r〉∈P ballr(x). A subset C ⊆ X is
closed if its complement is open. We call P a witness both for the open set U and
the complementary closed set X−U.
Theorem 3.33. (a) Open balls are open.
(b) The union of any sequence of open subsets of a metric space is open.
(c) The intersection of any finitely many open subsets of a separable metric space
is open.
Proof. The only subtlety occurs in part (c), which comes down to showing that
the intersection of any two open balls is open. We obtain a witness for ballr(x) ∩
ballr′(x
′) by letting X be a countable dense subset and taking the set of pairs 〈y, s〉
such that y ∈ X , s ∈ Q+, d(x, y) + s ≤ r, and d(x′, y) + s ≤ r′. 
Corollary 3.34. (a) The intersection of any sequence of closed subsets of a metric
space is closed.
(b) The union of any finitely many closed subsets of a separable metric space is
closed.
Definition 3.35. The closure of a countable set C ⊆ X is the set of all limits of
convergent sequences in C. X is totally bounded if for every n ∈ N there is a finite
set S ⊆ X such that every x ∈ X satisfies d(x, s) < 1/n for some s ∈ S. X is
compact if every sequence of closed sets, any finitely many of which have nonempty
intersection, has nonempty intersection. X is boundedly compact if every closed ball
ballr(x) = {y ∈ X : d(x, y) ≤ r} is compact.
(Closures exist by third order comprehension and a double application of nu-
merical omniscience: first we use it to check that for any x ∈ X and any n ∈ N
the condition ball1/n(x) ∩C 6= ∅ satisfies excluded middle, then we use it again to
check that the condition (∀n)(ball1/n(x) ∩C 6= ∅) satisfies excluded middle.)
Theorem 3.36. Let X be a separable metric space. Then the following are equiv-
alent:
(i) X is compact;
(ii) X is complete and totally bounded;
(iii) every sequence in X has a convergent subsequence.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Let X be a countable dense subset of X. Suppose X is compact
and let (xn) be a Cauchy sequence in X. For each k let nk be the smallest natural
number such that d(xn, xnk) ≤ 1/k for all n > nk. Then the set of pairs 〈x, q〉 with
x ∈ X , q ∈ Q+, and d(x, xnk) > q + 1/k witnesses an open set Uk. Applying the
compactness hypothesis to the sequence of complementary closed sets then produces
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a limit for (xn). This shows that X is complete. To verify total boundedness,
enumerate the elements of X (up to identity) as (zn) and observe that the assertion
“for every k there exists n such that every zi is within 1/k of some zj with 1 ≤ j ≤ n”
satisfies excluded middle. So suppose this statement fails. Then there exists k such
that for every n, some zi satisfies d(zi, zj) ≥ 1/k for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Using dependent
choice, we can then construct a sequence (nk) such that d(zni , znj ) ≥ 1/k for all i 6=
j. Finally, for each i the pairs 〈x, q〉 with x ∈ X , q ∈ Q+, and q < d(x, znj )− 1/2k
for all j ≥ i witness an open set Ui, and the complementary closed sets falsify the
compactness condition. Thus X must be totally bounded.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Assume (ii) and let (xn) be any sequence in X. By completeness it
will suffice to show that (xn) has a Cauchy subsequence. Let S1 ⊆ X be a finite set
such that for all x ∈ X there exists s ∈ S1 with d(x, s) < 1/2. Find s1 ∈ S1 such
that d(xn, s1) < 1/2 for infinitely many n, and let n1 be the smallest number such
that d(xn1 , s1) < 1/2. Then let S2 ⊆ X be a finite set such that for all x ∈ X there
exists s ∈ S2 with d(x, s) < 1/4, find s2 ∈ S2 such that d(s1, s2) < 1/2 + 1/4 and
d(xn, s2) < 1/4 for infinitely many n, and let n2 be the smallest number after n1
such that d(xn2 , s2) < 1/4. Continue in this way, with d(sk, sk+1) < 2
−k + 2−k−1
and d(xnk , sk) < 2
−k. Then (xnk) is the desired Cauchy subsequence.
(iii)⇒ (i): Assume (iii). Let (Cn) be a sequence of closed subsets with the finite
intersection property, and for each n choose a point xn ∈
⋂n
k=1Ck. Then (xn) has
a convergent subsequence, and the limit of this sequence belongs to every Cn. 
Proposition 3.37. If X is separable then the closure of any countable set is closed.
If X is separable and boundedly compact then every closed set is separable.
Proof. The first statement is easy: let X be a countable dense subset of X; then a
witness for the closure of any countable set C is given by the pairs 〈x, r〉 ∈ X×Q+
such that d(x, y) ≥ r for all y ∈ C. For the second statement suppose X is also
boundedly compact and let C ⊆ X be closed. We construct, for each x ∈ X and
r ∈ Q+ such that ballr(x) intersects C, an element of ballr(x)∩C. This produces
a countable subset of C that is evidently dense in C. To do this, fix a witness P
for C and enumerate P as (〈xn, rn〉). Let R be the set of pairs 〈x, r〉 ∈ X × Q+
such that for any n there exists y ∈ X ∩ ballr+1/n(x) with d(xi, y) ≥ ri − 1/n for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. This set exists by numerical omniscience. Observe that if 〈x, r〉 6∈ R
then ballr(x) ∩ C = ∅. But if 〈x, r〉 ∈ R then we can find a sequence (yn) such
that d(x, yn) < r + 1/n and d(xi, yn) ≥ ri − 1/n for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Letting y be a
limit point of this sequence (using bounded compactness and Theorem 3.36 (iii)),
we must have d(xi, y) ≥ ri for all i, i.e., y ∈ C. By dependent choice we can select
one such y for each pair 〈x, r〉 ∈ R; this is the desired countable dense subset of
C. 
Definition 3.38. A function f : X → Y between metric spaces is continuous if
the inverse image of any open set in Y is open in X. It is a homeomorphism if it is
a bijection and its inverse is also continuous.
Theorem 3.39. Let X and Y be metric spaces, suppose X is separable, and let
f : X→ Y be a function. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) f is continuous;
(ii) the inverse image of every closed set in Y is closed in X;
(iii) for any countable set C ⊆ X with closure C we have x ∈ C ⇒ f(x) ∈ f(C);
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(iv) f preserves convergence of sequences;
(v) for every x ∈ X and every ǫ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that d(x, y) < δ
implies d(f(x), f(y)) < ǫ.
(The proof is a straightfoward generalization of the proof of Theorem 3.27.)
Proposition 3.40. Let X and Y be metric spaces and suppose X is compact.
(a) Every closed subset of X is compact.
(b) If X is separable and f : X → Y is continuous then f(X) exists and is a
separable compact subset of Y.
(c) If X is separable and f : X → Y is a continuous bijection then it is a
homeomorphism.
Proof. Part (a) is trivial since every closed subset of a closed subset of X is closed
in X. For part (b) let X be a countable dense subset of X and let C be the closure
of f(X). Theorem 3.39 (iii) implies that f maps every element of X into C, and
Theorem 3.36 (iii) plus Theorem 3.39 (iv) implies that every element of C is in the
image of f . So f(X) exists and equals C. C is clearly separable, and compactness
follows easily from Theorem 3.39 (ii) (considering f as a function from X to C).
Part (c) is proven by combining parts (a) and (b) with both parts of Proposition
3.37, using the charaterization of continuity of f−1 in Theorem 3.39 (ii). (Y is
separable because it is the closure of f(X), as in part (b).) 
Theorem 3.41. The intersection of any sequence of open dense subsets of a sep-
arable complete metric space is dense.
(The proof is identical to the classical proof.)
3.6. Topological spaces. We introduce the notion of a family of subsets of a set.
Definition 3.42. A family of subsets of a set X is a subset T of X×T for some
set T. For each Y ∈ T we write T(Y ) = {x ∈ X : 〈x, Y 〉 ∈ T }. We say that Y
belongs to the family T if Y = T(Y ) for some Y ∈ T.
A topological space is a set X together with a family of subsets T of X such that
(i) ∅ and X belong to T ; (ii) the union of any sequence of sets that belong to T
belongs to T ; and (iii) the intersection of any finitely many sets that belong to T
belongs to T . T is a topology on X.
A subset of a topological space is open if it belongs to T and closed if its com-
plement belongs to T .
Definition 3.43. Let X be a topological space with topology T ⊆ X×T and let
Y ⊆ X. The relative topology T ′ on Y is the family T ′ = T ∩ (Y ×T).
It is easy to see that T ′ is a topology on Y.
Next we indicate how topologies can be generated from bases.
Proposition 3.44. Let X be a set and let B ⊆ X×B be a family of subsets of X
such that ∅ and X belong to B and the intersection of any two sets that belong to
B is the union of a sequence of sets that belong to B. Let T be the set of Y such
that Y(n) ∈ B for all n and let T be the set of pairs 〈x, Y 〉 such that x ∈
⋃
n B(Y(n)).
Then T is a topology on X.
Definition 3.45. The family B in Proposition 3.44 is a base for the topology T .
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Proposition 3.46. Let X be a separable metric space with countable dense subset
X. Let B = X × Q+ and let B ⊆ X × B be the set of pairs 〈y, 〈x, r〉〉 such that
d(x, y) < r. Then B is a base for a topology and the open sets are precisely those
identified in Definition 3.32.
Definition 3.47. Let (Xn) be a sequence of sets and let (T n) be a corresponding
sequence of topologies. Let B consist of all pairs 〈m,Y 〉 such that m ∈ N and
Y ∈ T1 × · · · × Tm. The product topology on the product
∏
Xn is the topology
generated by the base B ⊆ (
∏
Xn)×B consisting of all pairs 〈x, 〈m,Y 〉〉 such that
x(n) ∈ T
n
(Y(n))
for all n ≤ m.
Definition 3.48. A function between topological spaces is continuous if the inverse
image of any open set is open.
Proposition 3.49. The composition of two continuous functions is continuous.
Proposition 3.50. Let X be a topological space and let (Xn) be a sequence of
topological spaces. Then a function f : X →
∏
Xn is continuous if and only if
πn ◦ f : X → Xn is continuous for all n, where πn is the projection onto the nth
coordinate.
Definition 3.51. A topological space is second countable if it has a countable base
(i.e., B is countable). A subset C of a topological space is sequentially closed if the
limit of any convergent sequence in C belongs to C. The sequential closure of a
countable set C in a second countable space is the set of limit points of convergent
sequences in C.
In the last part of this definition we need C to be countable and the ambient
space to be second countable so that the statement “x is the limit of a convergent
sequence in C” satisfies excluded middle. This statement will be true if and only if
every basic open set that contains x intersects C.
Proposition 3.52. Any second countable space is separable.
Proposition 3.53. In any topological space, any closed set is sequentially closed.
In a second countable space, any separable sequentially closed set is closed.
Proof. The first statement is trivial. For the second, let C be a separable sequen-
tially closed set with countable dense subset C; we construct the complementary
open set as the union of all basic open sets that do not intersect C. Since C is
countable the condition U ∩ C = ∅ satisfies excluded middle, so this union exists.
Checking that it is the complement of C is straightforward. 
Corollary 3.54. In a second countable space the sequential closure of any countable
set is closed.
Definition 3.55. A topological space is compact if the intersection of any sequence
of closed sets, any finitely many of which have nonempty intersection, is nonempty.
It is sequentially compact if every sequence has a convergent subsequence.
Proposition 3.56. Any sequentially compact space is compact. Any compact sec-
ond countable space is sequentially compact.
Proof. The first assertion is easy: given a sequence of closed sets Cn with the
finite intersection property, and assuming sequential compactness, for each n choose
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xn ∈ C1 ∩ · · · ∩Cn and then let x be the limit of some convergent subsequence of
(xn). It is easy to see that x must belong to the intersection
⋂
Cn.
For the second assertion suppose X is compact and second countable and let
(xn) be a sequence in X. Then for each n the sequential closure Cn of the set
{xk : k ≥ n} is closed by Corollary 3.54. By compactness the intersection of these
sets is nonempty, and any point in this intersection is easily seen (using second
countability) to be the limit of some subsequence of (xn). 
Theorem 3.57. Let (Xn) be a sequence of compact second countable spaces. Then∏
Xn is compact and second countable.
Proof. The fact that the product of a sequence of second countable spaces is second
countable follows easily from the definition of the product topology. For compact-
ness, use the equivalence of compactness and sequential compactness and show that
any sequence has a convergent subsequence by successively extracting subsequences
that converge on the first n coordinates and diagonalizing. 
3.7. Measure theory. Measure theory presents a greater challenge to formaliza-
tion in CM because its usual development involves uncountable pathology in the
form of, for example, the Borel hierarchy on the real line. However, the fact that
every measurable subset of R is a Gδ set minus a null set strongly suggests that
this kind of pathology is not essential to the theory. Every measurable set is nested
between an Fσ set and a Gδ set with null difference, which motivates the following
definition.
Definition 3.58. A function on a family of subsets M ⊆ X ×M of a set X is
a function f with domain M such that M(Y ) = M(Z) implies f(Y ) ≡ f(Z). This
allows us to define the value of f on M(Y ) to be f(Y ). We may write f(M(Y )) for
f(Y ).
A family of pairs of subsets of a set X is a family of subsets M of X × {0, 1}.
For each Y ∈ M and i = 0, 1 we write Mi(Y ) = {x ∈ X : 〈x, i〉 ∈ M(Y )}, and we
also write M(Y ) = 〈M
0
(Y ),M
1
(Y )〉. M is a family of nested pairs of subsets if every
pair 〈Y0,Y1〉 in M satisfies Y0 ⊆ Y1.
A compatible function on a family of nested pairs of subsets of X is a function µ
on a family M of nested pairs of subsets of X with the following property:
if 〈Y0,Y1〉 and 〈Z0,Z1〉 belong toM and Y0 ∪Z0 ⊆ Y1 ∩Z1 then
µ(〈Y0,Y1〉) = µ(〈Z0,Z1〉).
Since Y0 ⊆ Y ⊆ Y1 and Z0 ⊆ Y ⊆ Z1 imply Y0∪Z0 ⊆ Y1∩Z1, the compatibility
condition allows us to define the value of µ on Y to be µ(〈Y0,Y1〉) for any subset
Y ⊆ X such that Y0 ⊆ Y ⊆ Y1. We may write µ(Y) for µ(〈Y0,Y1〉). We say
that such a set Y is measurable or µ-measurable.
A measure on a set X is a compatible function µ : M → [0,∞] on a family of
nested pairs of subsets of X such that
(i) ∅ is measurable and µ(∅) = 0;
(ii) if Y is measurable then so is X−Y;
(iii) if each set in a sequence (Yn) is measurable then so is their union, and if
the sets are disjoint then µ(
⋃
Yn) =
∑
µ(Yn).
The problem of constructing measures also requires a new technique. We cannot
use Carathe´odory’s method because it defines measurability using what would be
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in our context a third order quantification. However, it is not hard to come up
with a more direct construction that also works. We consider only the case of finite
measures, but passing to σ-finite measures would be a simple matter of partitioning
into finite measure subspaces.
Theorem 3.59. Let X be a set, let M˜ ⊆ X× M˜ be a nonempty family of subsets
of X which is stable under finite unions and complements, and let µ˜ : M˜ → [0, a]
be a function on the family M˜. Suppose that µ˜(∅) = 0 and µ˜(
⋃
Xn) =
∑
µ˜(Xn)
whenever (Xn) is a disjoint sequence of sets that belong to the family whose union
also belongs to the family. Then there is a measure µ on X such that every set that
belongs to the family M˜ is measurable and µ agrees with µ˜ on every such set.
Proof. We merely indicate the construction of µ. The verification that µ has the
desired properties is an exercise in measure theory and we omit it.
For any Y and Z in M˜ define d(Y, Z) = µ˜(M˜(Y )∆M˜(Z)), where ∆ denotes
symmetric difference. This is a pseudometric on M˜. Then let M be the set of all
Y such that Y(n) belongs to M˜ for all n and d(Y(m), Y(n)) → 0 as m,n → ∞. We
defineM by the prescriptionM0(Y ) = lim inf M˜(Y(n)) andM
1
(Y ) = lim supM˜(Y(n)),
and we set µ(〈M0(Y ),M
1
(Y )〉) = lim µ˜(M˜(Y(n))). This completes the construction of
µ. 
Definition 3.60. The function µ˜ in Theorem 3.59 is a premeasure, and µ is the
measure generated by µ˜. A measure is separable if it is generated by a premeasure
defined on a countable family of subsets.
Theorem 3.59 allows us to construct Lebesgue measure in [0, 1]n in the usual
way, or in Rn by partitioning into cubes.
Integration can be defined using similar methods. The definition is framed in
terms of a generating premeasure but it is not hard to see that the integral does
not actually depend on the choice of premeasure.
Definition 3.61. Let µ be a measure generated by a premeasure µ˜. We say that
a function f : X → R is simple if it is a finite linear combination of characteristic
functions of sets that belong to the family M˜. We define the integral of a simple
function f =
∑
aiχAi to be ∫
f dµ˜ =
∑
aiµ˜(Ai)
and we define the L1 distance between two simple functions f and g to be
d(f ,g) =
∫
|f − g| dµ˜.
A function f : X → R is integrable if there is a sequence (fn) of simple functions,
Cauchy for L1 distance, such that
lim inf fn ≤ f ≤ lim sup fn.
We then define its integral
∫
f dµ to be∫
f dµ = lim
∫
fn dµ˜.
Theorem 3.62. The integral
∫
f dµ is well-defined.
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Finally, we indicate how to get a version of the Radon-Nikodym theorem. The
technique of sequential approximation is again crucial.
Definition 3.63. A signed measure on X is a compatible function ν :M→ R on
a family of nested pairs of subsets of X that satisfies the same axioms as a measure.
A signed measure ν is absolutely continuous with respect to a measure µ if every
µ-measurable set is ν-measurable and µ(Y) = 0 implies ν(Y) = 0.
Theorem 3.64. Let µ be a separable finite measure on X and let ν be a (finite)
signed measure on X that is absolutely continuous with respect to µ. Then there is
a µ-integrable function f : X→ R such that
ν(A) =
∫
f · χA dµ
for every µ-measurable set A.
Proof. Again we merely indicate the construction. First, by separability there is
a generating premeasure defined on a countable algebra of sets. We can then find
a sequence of finite partitions of X by sets in the algebra, such that every finite
partition of X by sets in the algebra is refined by some member of the sequence. If
the nth partition is X = A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak then we define
fn =
k∑
j=1
ν(Aj)χAj .
We then check that the sequence (fn) is Cauchy and that this implies that it con-
verges absolutely on a set of full measure to a µ-integrable function f . This com-
pletes the construction of f . 
3.8. Banach spaces. For simplicity we take the scalar field to be real; complex
scalars do not carry any additional logical demands.
Our definition of Banach spaces is identical to the classical one. What is note-
worthy here is that most of the classical examples require some sort of coding. But
little Lp spaces do not:
Definition 3.65. For 1 ≤ p < ∞ let lp be the set of all sequences (an) of real
numbers such that
∑
|an|p < ∞, with norm ‖(an)‖p =
(∑
|an|p
)1/p
. Let l∞ be
the set of all bounded sequences of real numbers, with norm ‖(an)‖∞ = sup |an|.
Here the condition
∑
|an|p <∞ satisfies excluded middle because it is equivalent
to the condition “there exists K > 0 such that
∑m
n=1 |an|
p ≤ K for all m”. The
norm itself exists because the sequence of partial sums can be constructed using
dependent choice, and the supremum of that sequence can then be taken by Cauchy
completeness of R.
Spaces of the form C(X) with X a compact metric space cannot be directly
represented in CM because each element is supposed to be a third order object
(a function from X into R). However, this is not a serious problem because any
continuous function is determined by its values on a dense subset.
Definition 3.66. Let X be a separable compact metric space with countable dense
subset X . We define C(X) to be the set of all uniformly continuous functions from
X to R.
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Literally, C(X) is the set of bounded sequences (an) ∈ l∞ such that the map
xn 7→ an from X to R is uniformly continuous, for some enumeration (xn) of X .
C(X) inherits its Banach space structure from l∞.
At the Banach space level there is no particular advantage to working with the
functions themselves rather than their restrictions to a dense subset. However, we
certainly want to be able to work with individual elements of C(X) as continuous
functions on X. This is easily seen to be possible:
Proposition 3.67. Let X be a separable compact metric space with countable dense
subset X. Then the restriction of any continuous function f : X→ R to X defines
a sequence (an) in C(X), and every sequence (an) in C(X) is the restriction of
precisely one continuous function.
We use the Radon-Nikodym theorem (Theorem 3.64) to encode Lp functions:
Definition 3.68. Let X be a separable finite measure space with generating pre-
measure µ˜. We define L1(X) to be the set of all signed premeasures ν˜ on the family
M˜ which are absolutely continuous with resepect to µ˜, i.e., for all ǫ > 0 there exists
δ > 0 such that ∑
µ˜(Ai) ≤ ǫ ⇒
∑
|ν˜(Ai)| ≤ δ
for any disjoint A1, . . . ,An in the algebra. L
∞(X) consists of the premeasures
which satisfy the stronger condition that there exists K ≥ 0 such that∑
|ν˜(Ai)| ≤ K ·
∑
µ˜(Ai)
for any disjoint A1, . . . ,An in the algebra. We define L
p(X) for 1 < p < ∞ to be
those premeasures in L1(X) the pth power of whose Radon-Nikodym derivative is
bounded.
As for C(X), elements of Lp(X) are literally sequences of real numbers which
become premeasures when composed with a bijection from M˜ to N . Again, the
above definition could be extended to the σ-finite case by partitioning into finite
measure subsets.
The following analog of Proposition 3.67 is an immediate consequence of Theo-
rem 3.64.
Proposition 3.69. For 1 ≤ p <∞ the elements of Lp(X) correspond to functions
on X, modulo alteration on a set of measure zero, the pth power of whose abso-
lute value is integrable. The elements of L∞(X) correspond to bounded integrable
functions on X, modulo alteration on a set of measure zero.
In the σ-finite case we no longer have Lp(X) ⊆ L1(X), but we still have Lp(X) ⊆
L1loc(X), so can adapt the above result to this case.
Next we discuss duality.
Definition 3.70. Let E be a separable Banach space with countable dense subset
E. We may assume that E is a vector space over Q (cf. Lemma 3.11). We define
the dual Banach space E′ to be the set of bounded Q-linear maps from E to R.
The norm on E′ is defined by ‖f‖ = sup{|f(x)| : x ∈ E, ‖x‖ ≤ 1}.
As before, the elements of E′ are modelled as sequences of real numbers.
Proposition 3.71. The restriction of any bounded linear functional on E to E
defines an element of E′, and every element of E′ is the restriction of precisely one
bounded linear functional on E.
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We can prove a version of the Hahn-Banach theorem:
Theorem 3.72. Let E be a separable Banach space, let E0 be a separable closed
subspace, and let f0 : E0 → R be a bounded linear functional on E0. Then f0
extends to a bounded linear functional f on E with ‖f‖ = ‖f0‖.
Proof. Since E is separable, we can enumerate a dense subset (xn), and it will
suffice to show that f0 extends to E0 + R · x1; we can then recursively extend to
the span of E0 and x1, . . . , xn, use dependent choice to extract a nested sequence
of extensions, and amalgamate them.
The extension to E0 +Rx1 is effected just as in the classical proof. We need E0
to be separable so that the classical inequality
sup
x∈E0
(−‖f0‖‖x1 + x‖ − f0(x)) ≤ f(x1) ≤ inf
x∈E0
(‖f0‖‖x1 + x‖ − f0(x))
can be restricted to x ranging over a countable dense subset of E0, in order to
ensure that the supremum and infimum exist. 
The same result holds, with the same proof, for extensions from separable sub-
spaces of nonseparable spaces, but this requires the well-ordering ≺ of CM+. (See
Section 2.3.)
The weak* topology on the dual of a separable Banach space E is defined in the
usual way. Note that its restriction to the unit ball of E′ is second countable, and
even metrizable.
Theorem 3.73. The closed unit ball of the dual of any separable Banach space is
weak* compact.
Proof. We verify sequential compactness. This is enough by Proposition 3.56. To
do this let E be a countable dense Q-linear subspace of a separable Banach space
E and let (fn) be a sequence of bounded linear functionals on E, each of norm
at most 1. Enumerating E as (xn), we then successively extract subsequences of
(fn) which converge on x1, . . . , xk. Diagonalizing yields a subsequence (fnk) such
that the sequence (fnk(xi)) converges for every i. Thus every sequence has a weak*
convergent subsequence. (It suffices to verify convergence on a dense set in E since
the sequence (fn) is bounded.) 
We close with a version of Goldstine’s theorem. This is interesting because it is a
basic theorem about the second dual, yet in general second duals, even of separable
Banach spaces, cannot be constructed in CM. Separability of E does not imply
separability of E′, but we need E′ to be separable in order to construct E′′.
Our inability to form second duals might appear to reveal a serious limitation in
our ability to formalize standard functional analysis within CM. But the limitation
is not severe because typical applications of E′′ do not involve its Banach space
structure. Rather, they have to do with the behavior of individual elements of E′′,
which are not excluded from CM. (Though as we mentioned just above, if E′ is
nonseparable we would need to work in CM+ to prove the existence of elements of
E′′ −E.)
Goldstine’s theorem is a good illustration of this phenomenon. Its classical state-
ment is that the unit ball of E is weak* dense in the unit ball of E′′. But this really
comes down to an assertion about weak* approximability of individual elements of
E′′ by elements of E. That version of the result can be stated and proven in CM.
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Theorem 3.74. Let E be a separable Banach space and let φ : E′ → R be a
bounded linear functional of norm at most 1. Then for any f1, . . . , fn in E
′ and any
ǫ > 0 there exists x in the unit ball of E such that
|φ(fi)− fi(x)| < ǫ
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. In the statement of the theorem we have identified the linear functionals fi
on E with their representatives fi in E
′. That is, fi is the restriction of fi to a
countable dense Q-linear subspace E of E. Now fix f1, . . . , fn and ǫ; we claim that
there exists x ∈ E with the desired properties. Since E is countable this assertion
satisfies excluded middle, so we can prove it by contradiction.
Thus, suppose no x ∈ E satisfies ‖x‖ ≤ 1 and |φ(fi) − fi(x)| < ǫ for all i.
Consider the map T : E → Rn defined by T (x) = (f1(x), . . . , fn(x)). Then the
closure K = T ([E]1) is a convex subset of R
n (here [E]1 denotes the unit ball of E)
and it is separated from the point α = (φ(f1), . . . , φ(fn)) by a distance of at least
ǫ. So by a separation theorem for separable convex subsets of Rn, which has easy
elementary proofs, we can find a linear map g : Rn → R such that g(β) ≤ 1 < g(α)
for all β ∈ K. Finally, the map g ◦ T belongs to the unit ball of E′ but we have
φ(g◦T ) = g(α) > 1 by linearity, which contradicts the assumption that φ has norm
at most 1. This shows that the desired x does exist. 
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